Celebrate Lula’s Win Now, Because the Future Looks Pretty Rough

Celebrate Lula’s Win Now, Because the Future Looks Pretty Rough

In the end, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva won his runoff against
Jair Bolsonaro for the presidency of Brazil, becoming the first Brazilian
politician to be democratically elected president three times, whilst
condemning Bolsonaro to become the first sitting Brazilian president to be
denied a second term (Brazil’s longest serving head of state, Getúlio Vargas,
was only elected twice, though he also ruled Brazil as a dictator between 1930
and 1934, and between 1937 and 1945). It was, to be sure, a near-run thing. For after defying pollsters’ predictions and the expectations of many both in Brazil and
internationally that Lula would get the 51 percent of the vote needed to be
elected in the first round, Bolsonaro then gained ground in the last week
before the runoff, holding Lula to 48.2 percent of the vote while rebounding
to secure 43.2 percent for himself, a gap of about 6.1 million votes.

Bolsonaro’s surprisingly strong showing was chastening, not to
say terrifying—not just to the left both in Brazil and abroad, but also to the
Brazilian center and center right that had come to oppose Bolsonaro and dread
what he might do were he to win a second term, so much so that the former
four-time governor of São Paulo, Geraldo Alckmin of the center-right Social
Democracy Party, who had been defeated by Lula in the 2006 election,
was willing to sign on this time as Lula’s vice presidential running mate.

Nevertheless, it was widely assumed that Lula would gain votes
in the second round thanks to the support that he received almost
immediately after the first round from two longtime rivals: the third-place
finisher, Simone Tebet of the centrist Democratic Movement Party, the MDB, who
had gotten 4.16 percent of the vote, and the fourth-place finisher, Ciro Gomes
of the center-left Democratic Labor Party, the PDT, a onetime minister in
Lula’s government, who had received 3 percent. Their backing, observers
believed, would lead many of the 8.1 million Brazilians who had voted
for them to support Lula the second time around. It was also assumed that of
the 38 million voters who had abstained or spoiled their ballots in the first
round, more who participated in round two would
vote for Lula than for Bolsonaro.

Instead, it was Bolsonaro who grew stronger, and Lula won 50.9
percent to 49.1 percent, and by only two million votes—that is to say, with
less than half the number that had separated him from Bolsonaro in the first
round. This is not to downplay Lula’s personal victory, for his truly phoenix-like return from what seemed like political death and personal
disgrace. Having been president between 2003 and 2010, and then having remained
the dominant figure in his Workers’ Party, the PT, during the presidency of his
chosen successor and former chief of staff, Dilma Rousseff, before her
constitutionally highly dubious impeachment and removal from office by the
Brazilian Congress in 2017, Lula was himself given a nine-and-a-half-year
prison sentence for corruption. He served almost two years before being freed
provisionally by Brazil’s Supreme Court in 2019, and his conviction was
nullified in 2021.

On the Brazilian left, what happened to Dilma is all but
universally viewed as a slow motion right-wing coup. This may be overstating
things in the sense that one can also view Dilma’s ouster as a power play pure
and simple by her vice president, Michel Temer, to take her
place, as he indeed did. Nevertheless, the destitution of Dilma and the jailing
of Lula, who had planned to run for the presidency in 2018 but was barred from
doing so, opened the way for Bolsonaro’s victory in the presidential elections
that year. But today, it is Lula who has vanquished his enemies. The sole
bitter note is that Sergio Moro, Bolsonaro’s former minister of justice and the man
who, as a prosecutor, secured Lula’s conviction and was, in a sense, his Jean
Valjean, just won election to the Brazilian Senate.

Unsurprisingly, the Latin American left is
ecstatic. Argentina’s Alberto Fernández wrote on his Twitter feed: “Congratulations Lula!
Your victory opens up a new era in the history of Latin America … a time of
hope that starts right now.” Even before Lula had been declared the
winner, Gustavo Petro, the former guerrilla and a committed leftist who won the
presidency of Colombia last June, was
tweeting “Viva Lula,” while his vice president, Francia Márquez, tweeted that Colombia and
Brazil under Lula’s leadership would combine to “restore peace dignity and
peace to Our America [a catchphrase of the contemporary Latin American left].”
For his part, Cuba’s dictator Miguel Díaz-Canel wrote, “Cuba congratulates you,
dear comrade … Lula returns, the Labor Party of Brazil returns, social justice will
return.” He promised Lula that his
government could “always count on Cuba.” And not to be outdone, the president
of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, declared that with the return of Lula
to office, there would be “equality and humanism” in Brazil.

They are entitled to their moment of relieved excitement. But
the idea that Lula’s victory is ideologically akin to that of Petro’s or that,
as Ricardo Monreal, the majority leader of the Mexican Senate, put it excitedly in a tweet,
Lula will “direct his country [back] towards the left,” is entirely
far-fetched. For in reality, there are very few signs that we will see a return
of leftist dominance to Brazilian politics. During the campaign, Lula
emphasized over and over again that his government would not just be a
government of the PT.

And for him to succeed, Lula will have to make sure this really
will be the case. Lula’s own popularity—that is, the establishment,
coalition-building Lula of today, not the left-wing firebrand he once was and
the Latin American left hopes he still is—is quite high across a wide swathe of
Brazilian opinion. But outside of its strongholds in the states of the poor
northeast of Brazil, the PT is extremely unpopular, even among many who voted
for Lula. They may view his prosecution by Sergio Moro as persecution and his
imprisonment as a rank injustice purely motivated by the Bolsonarist right’s
desire to extinguish his political career, but they also firmly believe that
the PT itself was extremely corrupt under Lula and Dilma and remains so today.

However important his victory is, Lula is scarcely coming into
office with a resounding mandate from the Brazilian people, nor can one
legitimately speak of Bolsonarism being defeated even if Bolsonaro himself
lost. The right scored massive gains in the ideologically
fragmented Brazilian Congress, with Bolsonaro’s right-wing Liberal Party now the largest bloc
with 99 seats. Lula will simply not be able to get legislation passed without
the support of at least a part of the Brazilian right. In the Senate, where a
third of the seats were in play, Bolsonaro’s bloc is also the largest party.
And in the gubernatorial races, Bolsonaro-supported candidates won in 14 of
Brazil’s 27 states, while center-right (but not necessarily Bolsonarist)
candidates won in four others, including in Lula’s home state of Pernambuco,
leaving the center and center left with only nine governorships.

A Bolsonaro supporter even won the governor’s race in the
critical swing state of Minas Gerais, even though it voted for Lula for
president. In short, the right won the Congress and the governorships, while
Lula, not the left, won the presidency. In
the words of Benjamin Fogel, a brilliant analyst of Brazilian politics whose bona fides are
unimpeachable both as a fierce opponent of Bolsonaro and as a supporter of Lula
(they are not the same thing by any means), “Nobody else but [Lula], the
greatest Brazilian political mind of all time could have beaten Bolsonaro in
this election, and even then, it is too close for comfort.” And, he added,
“That’s truly terrifying.”

Lula’s challenges in office will be daunting. He
will be hemmed
in on all sides: a business establishment that will demand balanced budgets while
the popular movements of the left and the unions that are his base (gig economy
workers in Brazil tend toward Bolsonaro) will expect enormous increases in
social spending. And while there is a good deal a Brazilian president can do
unilaterally, and Lula can certainly reverse Bolsonaro’s determination to
shrink the role of the state, budgets must be passed by Congress. The one piece
of really good news, not just for Brazil but for the planet, is that restoring
protections to the Amazon is something that can largely be done by decree, and
these are moves Lula will unquestionably make.

And the conditions in Brazil Lula will preside over are very
different from those that obtained when he left office in 2010. For one thing,
the commodity boom that allowed him to pay for massive increases in social
spending may not be over, but it has very different characteristics in an era
of high inflation, low growth, and of course all the knock-on
effects of the war in Ukraine. And Brazil has been changed forever by the rise of the
evangelicals who are Bolsonaro’s and Bolsonarism’s most ardent and loyal
supporters. There were approximately 20 million evangelicals when Lula first
took office in 2003. By the time Dilma was impeached, they were said to number
about 60 million. Today, only five years later, there are between
65 and 70 million evangelicals in Brazil, a little under a third of its total population.

To say they will be restive under Lula’s government would be to
wildly understate the case. It is also worth noting that while recent elections
in Latin America indeed have brought the left to power in the continent’s five
most important economies (though to claim that Boric in Chile and Petro in
Colombia, let alone Maduro in Venezuela, belong to the same political family would
be absurd), this has not only been the result of an ideological shift. As the
Brazilian political scientist Oliver Stuenkel has pointed out, “Brazil’s
presidential elections mark the 15th straight opposition
victory in Latin America. Over the past [few] years, not a single democratic
leader has managed to get reelected or pick his or her successor.” And, he notes, “Brazil is angrier, more
divided, and the geopolitical context far worse” than it was the last time Lula
held office.

Brazilians celebrating Lula’s election in the streets of
São Paulo can hardly be blamed for doing so. A second Bolsonaro term really did
pose a threat to Brazilian democracy, which was why many on the center right
supported Lula. But once the euphoria is passed, one fears they will find that
in the coming years in Brazil, there will not be very much cause for

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *